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Divine Jurisdictions and Forms of Government in Himachal Pradesh
DANIELA BERTI
Like the flowers of a garland, the inhabitants of a 
hār  (territory  of  a  God)  are  bound  together 
(Vidyachand Thakur, Kullu 2001)
  
Travelling on the roads in the Kullu Valley in Himachal Pradesh, one may notice a visible 
sign that suggests a territorial division according to divine jurisdictions. The more you enter 
into such a jurisdiction, the more you will come across vehicles with the name of the specific 
god of the area written in self-adhesive letters on their windscreen. 
That village gods live in delimited territories is a common feature attested throughout 
the subcontinent. Studies on regional pantheons, particularly in the Himalaya, have shown the 
political,  administrative,  and  economic  dimensions  involved  in  such  local  cults.  In  Tehri 
Garhwhal, for instance, Sax (1991) notes that the public processions of the deities' palanquins 
carried  by  villagers  in  the  territories  of  earlier  kingdoms,  cancelled  out  ‘in  practice  the 
academic distinctions among politics, economics and ritual’ (Sax 1991: 203). In a similar 
perspective, Toffin (1993) considers the structure of the Indo-Buddhist Newar pantheon in the 
Kathmandu Valley as ‘a total social phenomenon ... at once religious, territorial and politico-
administrative’ (Toffin 1993:120). 
Such  interrelations  between  various  dimensions  of  social  life  are  not  without 
theoretical consequences in the field of Indian studies. There has been a strong and lasting 
influence (particularly in France) of Dumont's general theory on Indian society, according to 
which political and economic power, as well as territory, are separate from the ideological 
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sphere of religion, since they are encompassed by it and subordinated to it.1 According to 
Dumont and Pocock, ‘the territorial factor, the relation to the soil is not, in India as a whole, 
one of the primary factors in social organization. It is a secondary factor in relation to the two 
fundamental factors of kinship and caste’ (Dumont and Pocock 1957: 18). Territory, being not 
included in what Dumont calls the ‘ideology’ or system of ideas, beliefs, and values (Dumont 
1966: 15), is thus devoid of cognitive significance.
The present paper concerns a Himalayan region that corresponds to the former Kullu 
kingdom. I analyse how territory has been taught, organized, and transformed in various ways 
and in different periods, according to a plurality of interrelated logics: ritual, political, fiscal, 
administrative, and electoral. My aim is to show that territory is not only the basis of ritual 
and political organization or individual identity; it is also a central topic of reflection and of 
explicit discourse. 
The analysis will focus on the notion of  hār, used in the region to designate the area 
considered  to  be  the  jurisdiction  of  a  specific  god.  A  lawyer  from Kullu,  B.C.  Thakur, 
suggested  the following definition:
Hār indicates the area in which devotees of a particular deity reside. It refers, 
essentially, to a territory inside which the inhabitants use to honour a specific 
deity. In a wider sense,  hār can designate the people who live in a particular 
territory  (ketra)  belonging  to  a  deity,  which  are  called  also  its hārye  
(inhabitants  of  the  hār)  and  which  are  considered  as  the  political  subjects 
(prajā) of the deity. The inhabitants of a hār are territorially linked one another 
by the ties they have with the deity.
This definition points towards different aspects of the notion of  hār:  it is a clearly 
delimited divine territory; it points to the sovereignty of the deity over the inhabitants of this 
territory, defined as its ‘political subjects’; it entails territorial ties between the inhabitants at a 
same  hār.  These  various  aspects  will  be  analysed  in  the  following  pages  by  taking  into 
account successive forms of government in the region: first, a kingdom progressively came to 
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be established in the seventeenth century; then the British colonial administration took over 
by the end of the nineteenth century; last, the region became part of the democratic Indian 
state, following Independence. The scale of observations will also vary, taking into account 
either a village, or a group of villages, or the territory (once corresponding to the kingdom of 
Kullu) which nowadays forms an electoral constituency. The first part of the paper considers 
the hār from a historical perspective, by using oral accounts as well as colonial reports. In the 
latter case I will mostly refer to the manuscript of W.H. Emerson, a British administrator of 
early twentieth century. This document is full of details about the territorial jurisdictions of 
the  local  deities,  and shows how British  administrators  were occasionally  called  upon to 
interfere in the management of the cults of village deities. The second part of the paper will 
focus on the contemporary period,  for which I  will  use  ethnographical  material  collected 
during different spells of field-work between 1995 and 2001. 
First, I will briefly describe the main characteristics of the deities concerned.
Village gods as "social actors"
The expression devī-devtā (literally ‘goddess-god’) is used in the Kullu Valley to speak of the 
deities of the village temples. The worship of these village deities involves the intervention of 
various  temple  functionaries  -priest,  medium,  administrator,  musicians.  Each  deity  is 
considered to exercise his/her power within a delimited area, the hār, and the inhabitants of 
this area turn to him/her to ask for rain or sunshine, or to cure a villager's disease or solve a 
problem, or to arbitrate village conflicts. 
Each village deity  has  a  medium, the  gur,  who undergoes public  initiation. When 
consulted, the medium shows (culturally expected) signs of divine possession, and begins to 
speak on behalf of the deity. A village deity can also express itself through the movements of 
its palanquin, the rath, carried on the shoulders of the villagers at festivals. These movements 
are  supposed  to  be  provoked  by  the  deity  and  not  the  bearers.  Villagers  decode  such 
movements as expressing the deity's feelings, intentions and desires in response to a specific 
situation. For the devotees, the medium's words and the palanquin's movements allow village 
gods to communicate, to participate in village life, and to take decisions. 
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The worship of these deities is in the hands of an administrator (kārdār) and a group of 
villagers  who form the  temple  committee;  they usually  belong to  high castes.  Low-caste 
villagers participate in the worship, too, as musicians, medium, and devotees.2 Most of the 
village gods were previously the lineage deity of some dominant families in the region. Even 
today the worship of a deity may be the responsibility of one or several families. The god 
Balu Nāg, for instance, in the Banjar area, has ties with the Bhatta family, whose members 
still take the most important decisions concerning his worship. If we consider the god's story, 
however, priority is clearly given to territorial links over those of lineage. According to one 
story, Balu Nāg settled in the region of Banjar on arrival from the nearby district of Mandi, 
and the Bhatta family happened to be the first to worship him. Even when a village deity is 
linked to a particular family in the region, he differs from the category of ‘lineage deity’ by 
holding sovereignty over all those who live in his territory. These people form the  hār, or 
hārye,3 independently of kinship ties or caste status. The way for the deity to expresses his/her 
sovereignty is to bring benefits and punishments upon those living within his/her jurisdiction. 
Authority over land and territory 
The influence that village gods still exercise on the inhabitants of their territories through their 
mediums is often presented by local scholars as one of the reasons that forced past kings of 
the region to establish political relations with them, by means of alliance or subjugation. It is 
at  least  in  these  terms  that  M.R.  Thakur  interprets  the  decision  of  king  Jagat  Singh 
(seventeenth century) to introduce the worship of an outsider, Raghunāth (a form of Rāma), 
into the kingdom. The king declared this god to be the real ‘king of Kullu’, to whom all local 
deities had therefore to bow in reverence and obedience.4  In addition to this act of politico-
religious centralization, Jagat Singh also assigned land to different village gods, who then 
became  muāfīdār devtā (landholding  deities).  Following  this,  and  as  a  sign  of  political 
subordination,  the  village  gods  were  obliged  to  pay  an  annual  tribute  (nazarānā)  to 
Raghunāth. They also, for fear of being fined, had to visit the capital once a year during the 
annual festival in order to pay homage to the royal god and to his human delegate, the Raja  of 
Kullu. 
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The  king  exercised  control  over  the  management  of  worship  in  the  villages  by 
influencing, for example, the choice of a medium, the nomination of the temple administrator, 
or even by imposing the specific style in which a god's palanquin had to be built. He could 
also exercise some ‘pressure’ on village gods in connection with the power (śakti) they were 
supposed to have over atmospheric conditions within their territorial jurisdiction. In times of 
drought, for instance, the king used to organize in the palace a ‘universal consultation’ (jagtī  
pūch) of all the deities of the kingdom (through their mediums) in order to ask them to give 
rain. Local narratives add that, when the demand was not satisfied, the king would consider 
the mediums answerable for the gods' failure and would threaten to have their heads cut off if 
the rain did not come at once. 
Villagers  could  also  call  upon  the  king's  mediation  to  solve  cases  of  more  limited 
‘territorial droughts’. The measures to be taken in such circumstances were normally decided 
by the king or,  in his absence, by one of his representatives.  When the region fell  under 
British control,  the  Administrator  occasionally  had to assume a royal  role.  One of  them, 
Emerson, reports such an instance. When he was governing the region of Shimla, one day he 
received the visit of some villagers. They had come to ask him to punish the mediums of a 
very famous god in the region, Kamru Nāg, considered to be responsible for the rain shortage. 
It  was  clearly  up  to  me  to  do  something,  und  as  all  arguments  failed  to 
convince  the  people,  I  finally  gave  orders  to  the  Wazir  to  call  the  erring 
diviners, and without ill-treating them in any way to attempt to bring them to a 
sense of their duties. The peasants were more or less content with this show of 
activity, but the results were not satisfactory, and when a few weeks later, the 
diviners themselves appeared before me, I took the opportunity of reminding 
them of their duties, and the punishments prescribed for their neglect. They 
were  refreshingly  candid.  Kamru  Nag's  job,  they  admitted,  was  to  send 
sunshine  and  rain  in  their  proper  season.  If  he  failed  to  do  so,  they  (the 
diviners) were called to the police station and kept confined. If the rain did not 
then come within a reasonable time, they were made to stand naked in the sun; 
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or in fine weather was needed and rain fell, they were made to stand up to their 
waists in the river until the sun shone. They knew of no reason why the same 
measures should not now be taken, but they would like four days of grace, and 
if no rain came within that time, they would bow to whatever punishment was 
ordered. So they were given their four days, and as rain fell before they ended, 
no further action was necessary (Emerson, manuscript, 62). 
If the king - as reported by Emerson - had the right to punish inefficient gods through 
their  mediums,  he  rewarded  with  land  gifts  or  privileges  those  deities  who  satisfied  his 
requests. Many stories of royal donations tell how a deity received a certain amount of land 
from the king as a reward for having brought rain in times of need.5 
The relations between the central  authority,  exerted by the king on behalf  of  god 
Raghunāth, and the local authority, exerted by villagers on behalf of village deities, seem to 
have  always  been  complex  and  ambiguous.  In  his  study  of  the  economic  and  political 
importance of village gods in Kinnaur, Singh (1989: 89) notes that the kings ‘used the devtas 
as their representatives for manifesting royal presence in remote areas…. Since the Raja did 
not  frequently  visit  Kinnaur,  the  devta's  frequent  tours  on  his  behalf  manifested  divine 
sanction for the Raja's rule.’ 
The territorial implications of local cults thus appear to have been a crucial element in 
royal  politics.  On the  one hand,  the  assignation of  land  (muāfī)  to  village deities  can be 
interpreted as a political and religious form of centralization, for the prerogatives that local 
deities  already  enjoyed in  their  own territories  now had  to  be  sanctioned by  the  palace. 
Consequently,  the  king  could  also  delegate  to  a  local  god  his  royal  presence  in  distant 
regions.6 On the other hand, the control exercised by the king over the management of the 
cults had politico-territorial implications, for instance, the protection of the boundaries of the 
kingdom. As a rule villagers were not allowed to change the style of their god's palanquin 
unless so authorized by the king (Emerson 1920: 64); this was due to the fact that, since the 
style of a palanquin is associated with a specific kingdom, it would have meant that the god's 
supporters had established alliances with neighbouring kingdoms (Vidal 1998: 64). Thus, the 
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need  to  control  boundaries  appears  to  be  very  present  in  the  Kullu  kings'  political 
preoccupations.  True,  this  way  of  constructing  politico-territorial  boundaries  did  not 
necessarily involve map-making or physical delimitation, but was established through other 
symbolic means. It suggests in any case the need to reconsider the idea that that territory in 
India was defined by taking into account its centre, not its boundaries.
Another stereotype likely to be refuted by the present data is the assertion that the king 
ruled over territory not conceptually differentiated from a population, as suggested by the 
term janapada, which Dumont translated as ‘population-cum-territory’ and which he relied on 
to discriminate between what he claimed to be the ancient Hindu conception of kingship and 
the modern Western idea of nation, where territorial sovereignty implies the property of the 
land (Dumont 1966: 393).7 A different interpretation of the territorial conceptions linked to 
ancient Indian kingship is however given by R. Lingat (1967), which better fits the data for 
the kingdom of Kullu. In studying the Dharmaśāstra, the author identifies two main notions 
associated with kingship: the notion of rājādharma, the duties and obligations of the king to 
which he is submitted independently of the extension or localization of his territory, and the 
notion of  katra which is,  by contrast, ‘a power which is territorial in character, not only 
because it is applied within a territory and ends at the frontiers of the kingdom, but because it 
is conceived ...  as a regal right over territory, akin to a proprietary right that gives direct 
power over land and soil’ (Lingat 1967: 237, my translation). 
In any case, the overall property of the land itself was far from being an unknown 
component  of  sovereignty  in  the  Himalayan  kingdoms  (at  least),  a  fact  already  fully 
emphasized by the British administrators as shown by this passage from Lyall's Gazetteer: 
‘Under the Rájahs, the theory of property in land was that each Rájah was the landlord of the 
whole of his ‘Ráj’ or principality. … The Rájah was not, like a feudal king, lord paramount 
over inferior lords of manors, but rather, as it were, manorial lord of his whole country’ (Lyall 
1874: 24).
 The  donation  of  land  to  village  gods  as  well  as  the  donation  of  the  kingdom to 
Raghunāth emphasizes the importance given to landed property in the exercise of political 
sovereignty, which is directly legitimated here by deities. 
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Divine properties (muāfī) and areas of influence (hār): the British period 
With the beginning of the colonial period we have more information about divine territories 
and how they were managed by the British. When the latter settled in the region in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and undertook a revenue settlement, the first thing they 
noticed was the importance of land which came under the name of village gods. In his field 
notes, Coldstream8 wrote that in the subdivision of Prini :
‘[The god] Jamlu has a muafi [property exempted from taxes] of 94 [acri] in 
Prini and [the goddess] Sawari one of 42 [acres]. Two other deota [gods] have 
pretty assignments…[In the sub-division of Vashisht] seven gods have muafi 
in Vashist and four have temples as well. [The god] Thakur Ram Chandra 
owns 65 acres of land and has an assignment of 64 rupees.’ 
The  muāfī were  usually  confirmed by  the  British  administrators.  To  adapt  these 
assignations  to  the  norms  of  British  legislation,  the  administrators  introduced  a  ‘legal 
artifice’ (Vidal 1988: 76): a decree equated deities with ‘moral persons’ with the legal status 
of children, and granted them the right to basic amenities needed for maintaining their cult 
(ibid.).  These  properties  were  managed  by  a  temple  administrator  (kārdār)  who  was 
considered to be the god's ‘tutor’.9 
The  British  administrators  reported  the  difficulties  they  had  in  registering  these 
assignations for which often no kind of documents was available:
In taking a general view of the temple maafis in Tahsil Kullu, the first thing 
that strikes one is the great amount of land they possess … I have thought that 
the amount of land belonging to temples in Kullu was most excessive,  and 
should somehow or other be reduced, but after taking up and investigating a 
number of cases I came to the conclusion that it must be treated in a free, not 
technical manner. In the absence of sanads [written assignations] or ancient list 
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of  maafis  [holdings],  and for  lack of  maps or  field  books,  which were not 
produced  at  the  original  settlement,  it  was  not  possible  with  all  the 
untrustworthy evidence to say what the area originally granted by the Rajas 
was … There was no doubt  that  temple lands had often been held without 
sanads,  and  that  many  sanads  had  been  lost  in  the  disturbances  before 
annexation.  
Even if British colonial policy, as a rule, was to avoid interfering with local practices, 
it is quite possible that the survey they conducted favoured this or that local deity. A traveller 
in that period, Enriquez, informs us that a deity in the area was extremely angry because the 
revenue settlement did not properly ascertain the extent of his lands. The author also reports 
an episode showing how frequent it was at the time for a villager to transfer part of his land to 
a deity:10
the  priests  [of  the  temple]  insisted  on  the  sanction  of  Government  being 
obtained  for  such  a  gift,  because  they  said,  the  transfer  under  the  Land 
Alienation Act, could not  legally take place without such sanction, except to 
an  agriculturist,  and the  deota,  as  they  pointed  out,  was  a  god and not  an 
agriculturist. The case was sent up to Government, and sanctioned (Enriquez 
1915: 44).                                                 .  
The Gazetteers show that at the time of the arrival of the British in the region, the 
extension of a deity's hār never coincided with land cultivated in its name (muāfī). Emerson 
reports many cases in which a ‘deity’ tried to assert its own influence over the territories 
belonging to other neighbouring deities, also asking the inhabitants of these territories to pay 
tribute as a sign of their submission. The case of god Mahāsū, whose worship spread all over 
the region of Shimla, is a good example:
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For twelve years on end he is continuously on tour, visiting the various tracts 
where his worship has been adopted, accompanied by a retinue that grows fat 
on  the  offerings  of  the  people.  He  [the  god]  chooses  the  richest  and most 
pleasant villages to halt in, which have to bear the burden of his exactions. But 
the neighbouring villages do not escape scot free. Every family of his subjects 
in this districts through which he passes has to contribute one rupee and eight 
annas towards his expenses, the rupee being kept by his priest and the annas 
paid into his treasury. … Many other contributions were also exacted such as 
ghi, goats and supplies of various sorts. … To check these exactions, summary 
orders were passed in the presence of the assembled elders, banishing the god 
and his attendants from one district,  and commanding his  Wazir to  abstain 
from accepting any invitation on the part of Mahasu without the sanction of 
Government. (Emerson, manuscript, p. 11-4)
Emerson's  observations  do  not  allow  us  to  grasp  the  social  implications  of  such 
conquering actions. They show, however, how the British administration could disapprove of 
what the text describes as ‘exactions’ and could intervene therefore, through official actions, 
in order to put a stop to the expansionistic plans of a deity.11 
What also emerges from a story like this is how the extension of a deity's hār and the 
importance a deity assumes in the regional pantheon are subject to historical transformations. 
The worship of certain important deities may disappear, while that of new deities may be 
adopted by an increasing number of people. 
Such  expansion  does  not  imply,  however,  that  the  territory  within  which  a  deity 
receives tribute is its ‘property’. Land assignations, in fact, could be carried out in the form of 
muāfī only by the king,  and subsequently by the British administration. A deity's  area of 
influence therefore does not correspond to its landed property, even if a deity endowed with a 
large amount of land is considered powerful and influential throughout the region. 
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Following Independence, an event provoked a radical transformation in the regional 
pantheon's equilibrium and in relations between village deities and their land. In 1972, Indira 
Gandhi's  government  promulgated  the  ‘Pass  Tenant  Act’,  giving  the  opportunity  to 
cultivators,  including  those  who  cultivated  the  gods'  lands,  to  become  owners.  As  a 
consequence, village deities, also called  paisevāle devtā, ‘deities with money’, lost a large 
part of their holdings. All the deities that had given their land for cultivation at the time of the 
reform were deprived of their means of subsistence; the others have been able to preserve 
considerable holdings up to the present today. Some deities, whose land was formerly not 
cultivable,  found themselves suddenly rich as a consequence of the introduction of  apple 
orchards on land unsuitable for rice or other grain (Vidal 1988). Since this reform, those who 
cultivated gods' land in exchange for services rendered to the temple (priests, mediums, and 
musicians) have become owners; they were no longer obliged by law to continue providing 
services to the temple.12 
It is difficult to ascertain the impact of this reform on local cults. The registers dating 
back to colonial time show that at the beginning of the twentieth century some deities whose 
cult is  today abandoned or is extremely reduced,  possessed an important amount of land. 
However, we cannot be sure that a lapse in worship was caused only by the impoverishment 
of  the  divinity.  Long  before  land  reforms,  Emerson,  reports,  many stories  showing  how 
abandonment of cults were frequent and could result from a decision by villagers to react to 
the ‘inefficiency’ of the deity.
[The  god  of  rain,  Goli  Nāg]  originally  dwelt  in  Kulu,  where  for  many 
generations he never failed to send the rain and sunshine at their proper season. 
Suddenly, however, … he began to send nothing but rain, forgetting all about 
the need of sunshine. His followers tolerated this for some time [until when] 
they thought it time to give him some experience of the element he loved so 
much. So one wet day they took his idol, images and litter in procession to the 
river Sutlej and threw them into the torrent, an act of justice which, no doubt, 
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gave them some satisfaction for their ruined crops. (Emerson, manuscript, p. 9-
10)
 
The story goes on. After Goli Nāg's palanquin was thrown into the river, one of his 
metal masks was found on the riverbank by a passer-by who, happy to find such a treasure, 
took  it  home.  In  his  village  the  god  then  started  to  manifest  his  presence  by  sending 
impressive floods, which destroyed the whole harvest and spread terror among the people. 
Local mediums were consulted. They revealed that the one responsible for these disasters was 
Goli Nāg, whose mask was somewhere in the village. Through the mediums the god asked to 
be set up in place of a local goddess, and to receive daily worship.
So Goli Nag passed through the waters of tribulation to a lofty temple, where 
he has dwelt in ease and honour ever since. Only occasionally, bored by the 
unfailing alternation of the season, he turns summer into winter, or sends the 
rains at harvest time. 
This story illustrates the kind of transformation to which divine territories have been 
submitted: a village god abandoned by his own people in his own jurisdiction, and whose 
palanquin is thrown into the river, can be adopted by the inhabitants of a neighbouring village 
as the main god, with a new jurisdiction. The following pages will detail the ties established 
between a village deity and the inhabitants of its jurisdiction, and will also show how the 
rituals followed within the hār are related to the system of land taxation applied in the region 
during the colonial government.
Ritual territories and fiscal units 
In order to define a god's territory, Kullu people make reference to ancient administrative 
units that existed before the colonial period, and which were adopted by them in order to 
organize the collection of land taxes: the phātī, which includes a group of villages, and the ko
hi, which includes a number of phātī.
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An administrator,  Lyall,  reports  that  at  the  time of  the  Rājā's  rule,  kohi meant  a 
granary in which the grain that the peasants gave to the king as land tax was collected. The 
term was also applied to indicate the boundary of villages whose tax was put into the same 
granary. The phātī was a sub-division of the kohi, a term referring not so much to a territory 
as to a population sharing the services or the forced labour due to the king (Lyall 1874: 119).
The two terms were  later  adopted by  colonial  administrators  in order  not  only  to 
organize their revenue settlement and the collection of land taxes, but also as a criterion to 
distinguish various  devī-devtā by referring to the extension of their area of influence. Thus, 
Lyall writes in his official gazette: 
Most of these deotas [deities] are merely objects of worship of a single hamlet, 
or of one or two neighbouring hamlets; many, however, are known as the deo 
or devi of the whole of a  phati, or of a whole  kothi. A few of the larger and 
more noted shrines are generally respected, and their festivals attended by men 
from all the surrounding kothis, or by men of one or more waziris. 
According to Lyall, the divisions in  phātī and  kohi reflected the dominions of the 
ancient chiefs who had controlled the region before the centralization of the kingdom. In his 
view, the borders of a deity's hār were once political, being associated with the power that a 
lineage or a local chief exercised on one or more villages.
The divisions in  phātī and  kohi are today used in administrative language, and still 
define a deity's hār.13 In some regions, this hār covers a certain number of phātī included in 
different  kohi; in this case, people will speak of a ‘five  phātī deity’ or of a ‘seven  phātī 
deity’.  A clear  indication  of  the  limits  of  a  divine  jurisdiction  is  the  contribution  to  the 
expenses for annual or occasional ritual activities celebrated in honour of the deities. The 
frequency  of  the  contribution varies  according to  the  territorial  level  of  the  divinity:  the 
inhabitants of a village regularly participate in all the rituals celebrated in their village deity's 
temple , whereas they contribute on an irregular basis to those organized for the deity of the 
phātī or of the kohi. 
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Moreover, the multiple and relative territorial limits concern the influence that every 
divinity exercises on the territory and on its inhabitants.  Such influence is  also expressed 
during séances. For instance, Takak Nāg, the deity of a  kohi  of eight villages, used to say 
during consultations made at his temple: ‘blue sky here, blue sky in eight places; rain here, 
rain in eight places’. Or else: ‘rain from Nagar to Kullu [one kohi], blue sky from Nagar to 
Vasist [another kohi]; blue sky from Nagar to Kullu, rain from Nagar to Vasist’. Sometimes 
it is also a greater unit of the region which is evoked: a deity can say for instance ‘good things 
in a place; good things in seven wazīrīs [groups of kohi]’. 
Mediums often explain an  excess  of  rain  or  a  drought  as  a  result  of  the  frequent 
conflicts amongst villagers, and which demand ritual reparation. In the northern part of the 
valley (Parol), the logic of such reparation is the same in all the different kohi: if the conflict 
occurs inside a village, all the villagers should be involved in the ritual reparation 
The territorial influence of a devī-devtā is not limited to an area of worship - village, phātī, 
or  kohi -  but  is  a  sort  of  logic  determining  a  network  of  ties  encompassing  territories 
controlled by different deities. For instance, the deity of a particular village may be said to 
exercise influence over the entire territory of the kohi, even if inside his territory other village 
deities control one phātī or simply one or several villages. In the case of individual or village 
problems, only the village deity will be consulted. If the dispute affects several villages, the 
deity of the whole phātī or kohi will be asked to arbitrate the debates.14 In the northern part of 
the valley, the logic of this interpretation is the same in all the different kohis: if a mistake 
has been made within a village, all its inhabitants are summoned to participate in the ritual 
reparation; if it involves two villages of a same  phātī, all the villages of this  phātī will be 
considered responsible; if it involves two villages of a same  kohi, the whole  kohi will be 
asked to participate. Such a rule has the effect of mobilizing all the villagers included in one 
phātī or one kohi, who will try to encourage a compromise between the parties in conflict. If 
they succeed, they perform a collective ritual to pacify the deity.15 All the villages have to 
participate physically and economically in the ritual -not only those who are in conflict but 
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also those that are included in the same ritual subdivision, without even having any direct part 
in the conflict.
Let us see how this interdependence between ritual-territorial logic and the colonial 
fiscal-administrative system has left its imprint on the current situation. 
Territorial punishment and fiscal responsibility
In 1995 there was no rain in the Jagatsukh kohi for several months. There was a risk that the 
harvest would be completely destroyed. The inhabitants of the eight villages that formed the 
two phātī of this kohi were desperate. They constantly consulted the mediums of the village 
deities in order to find out the reasons for such a drought, and to ask for rain. The deities' 
answer  was always the same: there was no rain and there would not  be any till  the two 
villages of Prini and Banara, fighting each other within the same  kohi, put an end to their 
dispute. The god of Prini, Phāl Nāg, exercised his influence on a whole phātī which included 
three other villages. His brother, the god Takak Nāg of Banara, dominated the other phātī of 
the kohi. One of the consequences of the dispute was that the two villages refused to bring 
their deities' palanquins to common village festivals, in order to avoid each other.
The dispute lasted for more than a year.16 All efforts to find a solution had been in vain, 
until Śravaṇī's medium, the goddess of one village in the kohi, promised to bring rain as soon 
as the villagers reached a compromise. The negotiations began, facilitated by the fact that the 
rain started to fall in neighbouring territories. Let us look at a passage in one séance, during 
which Śravaṇī, speaking through her medium, linked the lack of rain to punishment inflicted 
by her.
Goddess  Śravaṇi's  medium:  Put your dispute on your head! You fight each 
other and you separated us! You play with swords and sticks but we... we have 
Indra-Samundra [we control the rain17]. These two brothers [the gods of the 
two villages in conflict] put the pillow in the opposite directions.18 It was in this 
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way that they brought rain. When Śandal  i  [the god of a nearby village] 
came here, it started raining in other places. But it is in these eight villages that 
the rain doesn't come! 
People of the village: Yes! In other places plenty of rain has come, but here 
nothing! Why doesn't the rain come here? You must tell us! 
The goddess thus reveals the territorial extent of her divine wrath. Simultaneously, by 
stressing these limits, she reinforces the conviction that the shortage of rain was because of 
her disappointment at the fight between the two villages. But villagers belonging to other 
villages in the kohi protested about being associated with the two guilty ones, and considered 
it unjustified to suffer the consequences of their misdeeds. 
Villager to the goddess  Śravaṇī: O Mahārāja! [term of address for any deity] 
You should punish the two villages of Prini and Banara but you should do 
nothing to the others. If someone makes a mistake, you don't have to punish the 
entire world! Tell us who is guilty and then you punish him. Otherwise, if you 
do this, all of us will suffer! The administrators of god Phāl Nāg and of god 
Takak Nāg must find a compromise. [addressing the two administrators:] You 
both, you take the decision, here, now! 
Those who found themselves involved in the dispute without being responsible for the 
fight tried to convince the temple administrators to reach a compromise. An agreement was 
eventually found. On the goddess's demand, the eight villages were required to participate 
financially in  a  reparation ritual.  The decision was facilitated  by the fact  that  during the 
séance, some drops of rain began to fall. On the day of the compromise, the rain arrived in 
abundance and all the villagers pointed out that it fell just within the limits of the kohi! 
This case confirms that as far as the god is concerned, the inhabitants of a  hār are 
jointly responsible. In this case, since the dispute arose between two villages whose deities 
16
dominated two phātī included in the same kohi, all the inhabitants of the kohi suffered the 
consequences of the divine disappointment and had to contribute to the reparation. 
Now,  these  rules  of  ‘divine  justice’  find  a  curious  parallel  in  the  system of  land 
taxation introduced by Barnes, a British administrator who introduced the revenue settlement 
in the region in 1851. According to this system, all the cultivators of the lands included in a 
phātī or in a kohi were jointly responsible for the payment of the land tax (Punjab District  
Gazetteers 1917: 145). We may wonder if the existence of a ‘joint ritual responsibility’ may 
have  influenced  the  British  decision  to  adopt  a  similar  logic  for  land  tax  collection19. 
However, according to Lyall, before the arrival of the British, there was no system of joint 
fiscal responsibility (ibid.: 144 ff.).20 In 1851, when Barnes introduced the new system, a 
headman was named for every kohi (or, if the kohi was too large, for every phātī) and all the 
tenants were made collectively responsibly for tax collection (ibid.: 145). In Kinnaur, a region 
near Kullu, such a procedure was not well received and there were widespread protests: 
[The  ministers]  did  not  remain  passive  spectators  in  the  face  of  this 
development but reacted strongly and got this Settlement cancelled within two 
years… [They] justified it by saying that the 'principal god of the country had 
expressed  an  opinion  that  the  cholera  which  was  then  raging  was  solely 
attributable to the money assessment  (Singh 1989: 106). 
Some administrators too criticised this system, finding it inappropriate for the socio-
geographical  conditions of  the region.  Barnes himself  observed that  in  Kullu,  contrary to 
villages in the north Indian plains, the land 
‘instead of being a coparcenary estate, reclaimed, divided, and enjoyed by an united 
brotherhood, is an aggregation of isolated freeholds, quite distinct from each other, and 
possessing  nothing  in  common,  except  that  for  fiscal  convenience  they  have  been 
massed together under one jurisdiction’ (Barnes 1885: 56). 
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We cannot say what motivated Barnes to introduce joint fiscal responsibility, and it is 
not possible to deduce from his reports whether he had any knowledge of the existence of a 
similar procedure in ritual contexts. Whatever the case, the consequence of this new system 
was that at the level of fiscal territorial units as well as of divine jurisdictions, the same logic 
was now adopted. In fact, in the northern part of the region (Parol), the villages named by 
British administrators in their official lists of phātī and kohi are the same as the ones jointly 
responsible at ritual level. 
The  correspondence  between  the  ritual  and  fiscal  system  appears  even  more 
meaningful if we compare the northern part of the region with the southern territory that was 
assigned as  jāgīr  to the Rājā of Kullu. Whereas since 1846 a great part of the region was 
submitted to direct British rule, the region of Rupi in the southern part of the Valley was 
assigned as rent-free jāgīr to the then Rājā of Kullu, Thakur Singh. Until Independence, the 
fiscal system in the two parts differed, and such a diversity seems to have had some effects at 
ritual level.
Colonial administrators inform us that at the time the revenue settlement was revised 
in 1868, the ex-Rājā (jāgīrdār) and Rupi people 
applied to the Settlement Officers to revise their record of right so as to bring it 
into accordance with the existing custom. The effect of the change was to do  
away with joint responsibility  within the  kothi, the jagirdar having to look to 
each  individual  landholder  for  payment  of  his  quota  (Punjab  District  
Gazetteers 1917: 159, my emphasis) 
Contrary to Parol, the joint ritual responsibility in Rupi never concerns a whole phātī 
in one kohi. It only affects some of their villages, sometimes even separate villages belonging 
to different kohi. Wherever joint fiscal responsibility has not been applied or, as in Rupi, has 
been rapidly abolished, it would seem that the most important ritual unit is not the kohi but 
the phātī, i.e. the group of people who share the services or the forced labour due to the king. 
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The fact that in the north the kohi is also involved in joint ritual responsibility may have been 
a result of the application of joint fiscal responsibility introduced during the British period.
In any case, what is certain is that in the whole region of Kullu and in nearby regions, 
the lists of fiscal phātī and kohi reported in the British gazetteers correspond to the multiple 
hār of  phātī and kohi deities. This should be taken as a trend, since the limits of the ritual 
territories as well as of the fiscal ones have been subjected in the course of time to slight 
variations. For instance I could observe in kohi Jagatsukh (in the north of the region) that one 
of the three  phātī of the ancient fiscal  kohi has been recently been dropped from the joint 
ritual responsibility as a consequence of unresolved conflicts.  
Thus, the overall  correspondence between fiscal-administrative territories and ritual 
territories does not exclude changes in their respective limits as a consequence of the social 
and  political  transformations  that  have  taken  place  in  the  region.  Even  today  the 
administrative system and the ritual system are not rigidly fixed. In fact, village panchayats 
overlap  with  ancient  fiscal  units  of  the  phātī,  still  in  use.  Moreover,  at  ritual  level, 
transformations are obvious if one takes into account the cults of the so-called ‘new deities’ 
(naī devtā). At the origin of these new cults, there is usually the ‘discovery’ in the earth of a 
statue or of a metallic face, and the consequent manifestation of the deity possessing someone 
– usually its future medium; it reveals its name and asks to be set up in a temple and adopted 
by the entire village, whose territory will come under its influence. 
We have seen that transformations in the pantheon also took place in the past, before 
and during the colonial period: some deities might lose their dominion while others might 
conquer  more  territories.  If,  for  the  past,  we  are  not  able  to  document  in  detail  such 
transformations in their historical and sociological context, ethnographic data show how such 
transformations can be linked to political interests or motivations at various levels.
This  last  section will  try  to bring to  light  how in  contemporary democratic  India, 
divine  territories  continue  to  have  politico-ritual  relevance  and,  in  some cases,  can  even 
influence the delimitation of electoral constituencies.
Divine jurisdictions and electoral constituencies 
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Within  their  own territories,  devī-devtā express  their  will  on all  private  or  public  issues, 
including the choice of a candidate to regional elections. J. Singh (1989) shows that in nearby 
Kinnaur, the success of a political leader depends both upon his personal charisma and on the 
approval he receives from the local deity:
No discussion of politics in Kinnaur can ever be complete without a mention of 
ubiquitous devi/devtas. No politician can dare to publicly cross swords with a 
village deity.  Candidates  for  elections  begin  their  campaigns  by  presenting 
offerings  to  the  local  deity  and  by  seeking  his  blessing.  Should  the  devta 
express  his  wrath  towards  a  particular  candidate,  the  latter  would  have  an 
uphill fight on his hands (Singh 1989: 37).
Most political  leaders who stand for local elections belong to the region and have 
strong  personal  and  devotional  ties  with  village  deities.  A  candidate  who  receives  the 
approval of a local  god will  be more readily supported by the people living in the god's 
jurisdiction. In this sense, the hār can become an important factor in polls: the larger the hār, 
the more the deity's support can influence the results. 
Some episodes that took place after Independence show how political leaders took into 
account these divine territories when reorganizing the electoral constituencies for the elections 
for the Himachal Pradesh Assembly in 1967. One example concerns the region of Banjar, 40 
km  south  of  Kullu.  There  the  god  Śṃgā  i  dominates  a  kohi  (Banjar)  next  to  the 
jurisdiction of  the  Balu  Nāg deity,  which  covers  a  territory  of  about  three  kothi (Sikari, 
Tiloknath, and Fathepur). The worship of Balu Nāg is in the hands of an influential family. 
One  of  its  members,  Beli  Ram,  an  influent  political  leader,  wanted  to  be  elected  in  a 
constituency that included the kohi of Śṃgā îi. According to Beli Ram's son, the Congress 
Party, in power at the time, refused to give him the ticket and supported another local leader, 
nearer to this god. Beli Ram then decided to contest the election as an independent candidate. 
Since his influence in the subdivision controlled by Balu Nāg would have discredited the 
Congress candidate, the Congress party -he said- managed to prevent the constituency from 
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being cut in two, incorporating the territory of Balu Nāg within a reserved constituency (Ani) 
and thus eliminating any chance of Beli Ram winning the elections. 
The importance of Śṃgā îi's hār in the electoral results is still taken into account by 
contemporary political leaders. The elected representative of the corresponding constituency 
to the Legislative Assembly was up until recently Karan Singh, a brother of the Rājā of Kullu, 
both leaders of the Hindu right-wing party, the BJP.21 According to a widespread opinion 
among Balu nāg's supporters, the Rājā, Mahesvar Singh, is today Śṃgā îi's ally because he 
wants  the  inhabitants  of  the  corresponding constituency to  go  on  supporting  his  brother. 
According to them a manifestation of such an alliance takes place at the annual festival of 
Dashera, when all the devī-devtā's palanquins are brought by their villagers to the capital to 
pay homage to Raghunāth and to his human representative, the Rājā. Since the latter was up 
until  recently  also  a  member  of  the  New Delhi  Parliament,  and  president  of  the  festival 
committee,22 Balu nāg's people accuse him of using his power to place Śṃgā îi's palanquin 
in the highest place during the two main Dashera processions: immediately to the right of 
Raghunāth's ceremonial chariot . While they consider instead that their own god should have 
been given this honorific position by tradition, they accuse the king of interfering in the ritual 
rules with his electoral politics. 
Śṃgā îi and Balu Nāg are both ‘landholding’ deities (muāfīdār devtā), whose hār is 
sufficiently large to assume political weight, at least in regional elections. But even the so-
called  ‘new’  deities,  devoid  of  property,  and  whose  worship  is  recent,  can  assume  an 
important role in this political-ritual system of alliances. This is the case, for instance, of 
goddess Pañcālī who is regularly gaining in importance since her current medium, a rather 
charismatic  person,  has  been  active  now for  about  ten  years.  It  is  said  that  the  goddess 
manifests herself with all her power (śakti) and many people come from far to consult her and 
ask for her protection. Mahesvar Singh shows a special predilection for this goddess as he 
thinks she has decisively supported his political career. One of the last episodes taken as proof 
was when the king was elected to Parliament, in 1998. An inhabitant of the village of Pañcālī 
recounted the episode to me:
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The party of Raja [the BJP] was not in power at that time and the goddess 
[consulted by the raja through her medium] said ‘if you come here with your 
heart,  I  will  change  the  kingdom of  Delhi’.  Six months  later,  in  1998,  the 
government of Delhi changed [the Hindu right came to power], and the Raja 
became a member of the Indian Parliament! 
In order to thank the goddess, the king is said to have contributed to the building of a 
new temple for her. The consecration ceremony as described by the priest of Pañcālī shows 
how this goddess, lacking a traditional hār, has tried to extend her area of influence by taking 
advantage of the king's support: 
On the day of the ceremony, the goddess, through her medium, gave an order 
to a messenger to go to the palace and to tell the king to come to the temple. 
During  the  celebrations,  the  raja  started  trembling  [manifesting  divine 
possession]. When they were setting up the statue of the goddess in the new 
temple, tears came to the Raja's eyes. There were thousands of people here and 
they all were scared of what the goddess might do. During the consecration 
ceremony, the goddess covered [in procession, with her palanquin] more than 
twenty villages. She was in a violent mood and asked for many sacrifices. [Her 
palanquin] went to all the nearby localities, to Balu Nāg's hār, Markhanda îi's 
hār, and also to the village of Alva. There she set up her boundary. Nobody 
could stop  her.  Five  kilometres  away  there  is  the  village  of  Manglore  and 
behind that, Tipri. Her procession made its way there. Thanks to the king and 
to the participation of all these villages, we offered a great sacrifice [with a lot 
of animals]. 
The procession thus enabled the goddess to declare the ambit of her influence in order 
to recruit new ‘supporters’ -as people in Kullu often say. Processions are frequent in this part 
of  India  for  marking a  deity's  influence within a  territory.  In  the nearby region of  Tehri 
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Garhwal,  for  instance,  pilgrimages  carried  out  with  the  deity's  palanquin  through  several 
administrative  units  ‘represent  and  unite  the  territories  in  which  they  occur  by 
circumambulating them’ (Sax 1991: 204).23
The example of Pañcālī, as well as those described by Sax or by Emerson (reported 
previously) and concerning  the colonial period, show that if the regional pantheon of these 
Himalayan regions appears ‘almost always [to reproduce] some political-ceremonial areas... 
referring to a more or less distant royal past’ (Toffin 1993: 100), they are nevertheless still 
likely to be re-defined and re-shaped on the basis of power relationships between villages or 
according to the vicissitudes of electoral politics. 
Like the kings of the past, the political leaders of Kullu (and not only those belonging 
to royal families) create ties with the local territorial deities and establish alliances with them, 
thus  provoking  some  transformations  in  the  structure  of  the  regional  pantheon.  What  is 
significant is that Mahesvar Singh announced a proposal to assign all the sterile lands of Kullu 
to temple deities. Had it  been accepted, such a gesture would have increased, albeit  with 
sterile  lands,  the  gods'  holdings,  offering  ‘new’  deities  the  opportunity  to  become 
‘landowning’ deities, and reinforcing the identification of Mahesvar Singh in his ritual role as 
a king, donor of land to deities for whom he demands respect and obedience. 
Conclusion
In his study on ‘small kingdoms’ in Orissa, Schnaepel (1994: 153) distinguishes two levels of 
political-territorial authority corresponding to two categories of deities, having different links 
with territories: one which is associated with local territories and with deities considered to be 
autochthonous; and the other covering the whole kingdom and with which deities introduced 
from the outside are associated. 
We have seen that the contrast between these two levels of authorities is also present 
in Kullu. The god-king Raghunāth, whose worship was introduced from the plains by the 
king, does not have the same kind of relation with territory that local deities have within their 
jurisdiction.  Raghunāth  does  not  have  a  specific  hār,  and  having  neither  medium  nor 
palanquin he cannot be consulted directly by the inhabitants of his kingdom. The relationships 
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that villagers maintain with him are limited to royal festivals, when devī-devtā's palanquins 
are brought to the capital to pay him homage. If he is the sovereign authority in the kingdom, 
over the people and the devī-devtā, he does not directly intervene in its prosperity or in the 
inhabitants' well-being.
By contrast, the  devī-devtā's relationship with their respective territory does not rely 
on the sole exercise of a sovereignty in their jurisdiction, but also involves the demonstration 
of the power (śakti) they have over land, the weather, and disease. We have seen god Goli 
Nāg lose his territory because he let rain pour down uncontrollably, and conversely goddess 
Pañcālī gained some territory thanks to the power she manifested in satisfying the demands of 
those who consult her. 
Both the models show, however, how the territorial factor is a referent around which 
the social, political and religious life of the region is organized. Moreover, territory is not 
solely associated with political power, but is situated, according to Dumont, outside so-called 
‘ideology’.  If  ‘ideology’  is  for  Dumont  ‘a  system of  ideas  and values’  and includes ‘the 
conscious aspects’ of the social system (Dumont 1966), the material presented here shows 
that territory, far from being reducible to an ‘empirical’ dimension of the social organization, 
plays  an  important  role  in  local  discourse  and  is  used  as  a  theoretical  and  ‘ideological’ 
dimension framing social behaviour and religious and ritual activity.    
Territory is not only linked to the political sovereignty of Raghunāth or of local gods, 
but is also taken as a referent for social identity and for the ritual solidarity of the inhabitants 
of the different  hār. During village festivals, in which hārye  of different deities participate, 
each villager identifies himself with his own ‘god-palanquin’, who thus becomes a referent 
not for defining his lineage or his caste, but for defining the place from where he comes or, 
more exactly, where he lives. As opposed to what Malamoud suggested in relation to the 
Vedic notion of grāma, ‘village’, here the referent for defining the hār is not ‘the cohesion of 
the group which forms it’, but rather the very area that constitutes it.
The importance of divine territoriality also explains the sustained political importance 
of village gods in the different systems of government that have historically succeeded one 
another in the region. Thanks to their mediums, their palanquins and the inhabitants of their 
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jurisdictions, local gods not only participate in local, political and religious life but, in the past 
as much as in the present, they establish close alliances with the central form of authority – 
the Rājā, the British administrators, and now political leaders. In this sense, the cults of devī-
devtā show that territorial dimensions are not exclusively associated with the political domain 
of society but are at the very focus of the religious and ritual activities and discourses. 
NOTES
1. For a discussion of these theories, cf. (among others) Galey (1989), Dirks (1996), Burghart 
(1987).
2. The main caste of the region is the Kanet, who now call themselves Rājpūt or Thākur. The 
Dāgī, of low status, are also numerically important. Brahmans are present but few in number, 
or concentrated over a few villages.
3. A change of residence does not necessarily sever the links of a deity with the original hār. 
For instance, village women used to marry outside their natal village and to go to live in the 
in-laws' village, because of the virilocal system of residence. During periods of hardship, a 
married woman tends to become closer to her natal village deity again. This deity, consulted 
through his/her medium, may say that he/she wants to be set up in the in-laws' house and be 
worshipped there. If this demand is accepted, the deity will settle in the in-laws' house not as a 
village deity, but as a family or house deity. This does not prevent the woman, once married, 
from being under the authority of her husband's lineage deity or of her husband's village deity 
(compare Sax 2000).
4. From that moment on, the official acts of the kingdom were issued in Raghunāth's name. 
The  statue  of  this  god,  which  according  to  local  stories  comes  from  Ayodhya,  is  still 
worshipped by the descendants of the royal family. Four or five priests are in charge of daily 
worship. They wake the god and his consort, wash them, apply their make up, dress them in 
royal robes, worship them and seat them on a throne so that visitors to the temple may receive 
their darśan (vision).
5. Vidal (1988: 56) reports how the ruler of Bashar assigned five villages to a deity of the 
Rohru district to thank him for having brought rain.
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6. In Orissa, Kulke (1986: 154) notes that by giving land to gods the Oriya kings wanted to 
have ‘a nominal leadership among the Hindu rajas of east and south India’. According to him 
‘In order to justify this claim and to strengthen his power, both inside and outside of Orissa, 
he declared the Lord of Puri the Supreme King of his empire’. Reference to this kind of gift is 
also  found in  the  dynastic  stories  of  Himalayan kingdoms near  Kullu:  for  the  district  of 
Kinnaur, for example, Singh (1989: 88) writes that no act of the state ‘was performed without 
the approval of Bhima Kami, who was regarded as the ruler of the land’. Land gifts to gods 
are also attested in southern India (Waghorne 1989: 405).
7. This idea of Dumont has been adopted by some historians (cf. Wink 1986) and taken for 
granted by other scholars (for example: ‘in the Indian political tradition, such as it appears for 
instance  in  the  Arthashastra,  territory  has  an  ambiguous and subordinate  place’,  Jaffrelot 
1996: 75).
8.  Coldstream  was  responsible  for  revising  the  system  of  land  taxation  in  1910.  The 
manuscript can be found in the Land Office in Kullu.
9.  In  various  parts  of  India,  village  temple  deities  have  land  registered  in  their  name. 
Sontheimer  (1964)  shows  that  god  as  landowner  has  been  the  topic  of  a  longstanding 
discussion, not only among jurists but also among philosophers and theologians who linked 
this to the debate on the nature of the idol -whether or not it could be considered as the deity's 
body,  endowed  with  intelligence  and  sensory  organs.  Sontheimer  shows  the  difference 
between positions defended by jurists and by materialistic philosophers, for whom the land 
was given to a god only in a figurative and metaphoric sense (thus implying that the priest 
was  the real  beneficiary),  and the popular  belief  also shared by theistic  philosophers,  for 
whom the god was the real owner. This idea, according to the author, was somewhat reified 
when British administrators in the nineteenth century surveyed the lands of village gods -even 
if  the  notion  of  god  was  then  reduced  to  an  abstract  juridical,  purely  ideal  entity.  Also 
Annoussamy (1979), Derrett (1968), and Colas in this volume.   
10. In this kind of situation British administrators often considered the god as the subject, thus 
adopting the local point of view. In some cases I will respect this usage.
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11. Vidal analyses some stories collected by Emerson, which illustrate how a deity could try 
to  impose  himself  on  another  deity's  territory,  and  the  hostility  that  this  could  provoke 
between the two gods' respective supporters (Vidal 1988: 64ff). In some cases, the territories 
for which the gods were competing seem to correspond to those of rival political  groups 
(quoted in Vidal 1988: 55).
12. Nevertheless, temple functionaries, even after officially becoming owners of the temple 
lands  they  cultivated,  usually  continue  to  offer  their  services  to  the  temple  for  fear  of 
provoking the deity's anger. Cf. Vidal (1988) and Berti (2001).  
13. They coexist with the panchayat divisions which roughly coincide with the phātī. While 
phātī  and  koðhi  are still referred to by the land administration, it is the panchayat that are 
otherwise referred to for most other administrative and political purposes.   
14. A parallel to these subdivisions can be found in Kinnaur where, instead of koðhi or phātī, 
the terms used are khund and ghori (Raha 1978 : 95).
15. The ritual is decided by the deity and may consist in the sacrifice of an animal or in a 
Brahmanic ritual of vegetable oblations in a sacred fire.
16. For a detailed analysis of this conflict, see Berti (2001: chap. X).
17. It is the god Indra, one of the gods of the classical Indian pantheon. In local myths this 
god  gives  rain  to  the  god  Takîak  Nāg,  implicated  in  the  conflict.  The  association  with 
Samundra, the primordial ocean, emphasises the capacity to give rain.  
18. It means that the brothers Phāl Nāg and Takîak Nāg sleep in the same bed side by side -i.
e. they are very close.
19. The opposite hypothesis seems improbable, since the joint ritual responsibility is applied 
at all levels of worship units (village, phātī, koðhi) and for a number of different situations – 
not only in times of conflict but also for all kinds of ritual work (work to build or repair the 
temple or the god's images, etc.).
20. We know that the system, at least in theory, has also been used elsewhere in India since 
medieval times, as well as in some regions of Nepal (Regmi 1978: 142).
21. Even if British administrators have withdrawn the title of rājā from the kings of Kullu, this 
decision did not have any effect from a ritual point of view: they keep intact their role vis-à-
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vis the local deities as Raghunāth's first devotee and representative. They continue to live in 
the Kullu palace and to finance worship of Raghunāth. Thus, though Mahesvar Singh, the 
actual Rājā, has neither power as Rājā nor any official title, he still continues to be called 
‘Rājā’ by the local people. It is in this sense that the term Rājā is used here when referring to 
him.   
22.  Since the 1970s,  the annual  festival  in  honour of Raghunāth has  become a ‘National 
Festival’ and is partly financed by the state of Himachal Pradesh. Consequently a Festival 
Committee has been created, whose President changes according to the party in power. When 
the Rājā was a Member of Parliament, he assumed two roles during the celebrations: a ritual 
one  as  delegate  of  Raghunāth,  and  a  political  one  as  MP  and  President  of  the  Festival 
Committee. He alone takes decisions concerning the relative positions to be attributed to the 
deities' palanquins. The distribution of these positions is crucial in defining the hierarchical 
relations  between  villages,  and  plays  an  essential  role  in  the  alliances  between  political 
leaders and groups of villagers (Berti 2005).
23. On palanquin processions in the Katmandu Valley see Toffin (1982).
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